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AG-GAG FREE NATION
ShaakirrahR. Sanders*

This Article identifies the threat that agriculturesecurity
legislation-or ag-gag laws-pose to unauthorized animal
and agribusiness workers. This Article advocates full
recognition of First Amendment speech rights to
unauthorized workers, especially in the ag-ag context, to
counter the threat of coercion. Part I of this Article profiles
unauthorized workers in the U.S. animal and agriculture
industry. Part II discusses nationwide First Amendment
litigation on ag-gag laws and describes how the effects on
unauthorized workers has been largely ignored in the ag-gag
debate. PartIII theorizes how the right that ag-gag laws seek
to protect weighs against the First Amendment rights of
unauthorizedworkers.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.
III.
IV .
V.

INTRODU CTION .........................................................................
UNAUTHORIZED WORKERS IN THE U.S. ANIMAL AND
AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY .........................................................
AGRICULTURE SECURITY LEGISLATION ...................................
AG-GAG FREE N ATION .............................................................
C ON CLU SION ............................................................................

492
496
507
517
529

*
Professor, University of Idaho College of Law. This author thanks
Chynna Castoro for her diligent research assistance and Kelly Stevenson for her
editing support. The author also thanks the Wake Forest Law Review and
participants of the 12th Annual Lutie Lytle Black Women Law Faculty Writing
Conference, the 10th Annual Constitutional Law Colloquium, and the 2018 ACS
Constitutional Law Scholars Conference for their helpful feedback. This author's
media discussing Idaho's agriculture security legislation can be found at: Adam
Cotterell, Why Idaho May Have Trouble Defending Its 'Ag-Gag' Law, BOISE ST.
PUB. RADIO (June 23, 2014), http://boisestatepublicradio.org/post/why-idahomay-have-trouble-defending-its-ag-gag-law; Alex Crescenti, U of I Professor's
Opinion on Idaho's Ag Gag Law Ruling, KLEW NEWS 3 (Aug. 5, 2015),
https://klewtv.com/news/local/u-of-i-professors-opinion-on-idahos-ag-gag-lawruling; Carol Ryan Dumas, Law Prof Says Ag-Gag' Decision Hard to Overturn,
CAP. PRESS (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.capitalpress.com/Idaho/20150807/lawprof-says-ag-gag-decision-hard-to-overturn.

[Vol. 54

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

492

I. INTRODUCTION
"In

recent years, there has [been]

. . . recognition that the

industrial produce and animal production and processing systems in
the United States would collapse without the immigrant and
migratory workforce."1 State and federal agencies lack the resources
to monitor the U.S. agriculture industry, an industry of historical2
significance when it comes to abuse against noncitizen workers.
Animal and agriculture work continues to rank among the most
dangerous U.S. industries. 3 For example, fatalities and injuries
among farm laborers are significantly higher when compared to all
The animal and agriculture industry is also
other workers. 4
5
especially prone to labor trafficking and wage theft. The Atlantic
recently detailed pervasive sexual harassment and discrimination
6
against unauthorized female animal and agriculture workers.
The 2015-16 National Agriculture Workers Survey ("NAWS")
reports that 69% of hired farm workers in the United States were
born in Mexico, 7 the same country that Donald Trump repeatedly8
disparaged and vilified during the 2016 presidential election.
Currently, the percentage of Mexicans in agribusiness outweighs the
percentage of Mexicans in most other industries. Members of the
Latino community are 16.2% of the U.S. workforce and of those, 62.1%

1. Claire Fitch et al., Public Health, ImmigrationReform and Food System
Change, CLF REPORT at 2 (2017), https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-andinstitutes/j ohns-hopkins-center-for-a-livable-future/_pdf/researchlclf reports
/public-health-immigration-reform-and-food-system-change.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Agricultural Safety, NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
(NIOSH) (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/aginjury/default.html.
4. Brief of Amici Curiae United Farm Workers of America Supporting
Plaintiffs-Appellees Urging Affirmance at 12, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden,
878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-35960) (citing OSHA Safety and Health
LAB.,
DEP'T
Operations,
Agricultural
Topics:
https://www.osha.gov/dsg/topics/agriculturaloperations).
5. Id. at 24, 26 (citing N.M. CTR. ON LAW & POVERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS ALERT:
NEW

MEXICO'S

INVISIBLE

AND

DOWNTRODDEN

WORKERS

(July

4

2013),

http://nmpovertylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/O4/Report-FINAL-2013-0723.pdl).

6. Ariel Ramchandani,
America's

Farms, ATLANTIC

There's a Sexual-Harassment Epidemic on
(Jan. 29,

2018),

https://www.theatlantic.com

/business/archive/2018/01/agriculture-sexual-harassment/5501

09

/.

TRISH HERNANDEZ & SUSAN GABBARD, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL
7.
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY (NAWS) 2015-16: A DEMOGRAPHIC AND
EMPLOYMENT PROFILE OF UNITED STATES FARMWORKERS, RESEARCH REPORT No. 13

https://www.doleta.gov/naws/pages/research/docs/NAWSResearch-Report
1,
_13.pdf.
8. Katie Reilly, Here Are All the Times Donald Trump Insulted Mexico, TIME
(Aug. 31, 2016), http://time.com/4473972/donald-trump-&/.
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are of Mexican descent. 9 From 1989 to 2000, the percentage of
Mexicans who were farm workers increased from 40% to 53%.10
It is unclear whether then-candidate Trump's views about
Mexicans and other members of the Latino community were
influenced by historic U.S. immigration law and policy. Federal
immigration law has long reflected U.S. racial biases,11 even though
Congress did not define "unauthorized alien" until 1986.12 During the
Great Depression, "over 400,000 Mexican nationals and [U.S.]
citizens of Mexican descent were deported or repatriated."13
Curiously, during much of President Trump's youth and early
adulthood, the "cultural category of 'illegal alien"' may not have
existed. 14 In 1952, Congress created the term "lawful permanent
resident"15 and instituted new categories of "nonimmigrant" visas. 16
By the late 1960s, Congress imposed its first numerical quota on
Western Hemisphere immigration 17 and increased deportations by
approximately 40%, despite an increasing need for labor.1 8 In 1976,
the United States issued a 20,000 person immigration quota per each
Western Hemisphere nation, including Mexico. 19 There were 781,000
deportations to Mexico the first year that the quota was implemented,
with less than 100,000 deportations for all other nations. 20
Perhaps because of the high percentage of unauthorized persons,
the conditions of animal and agriculture workers remain matters of
significant public interest-even if the subject has largely been
ignored by President Trump. Yet, some states have enacted laws that
discourage undercover investigations into the industry. This Article
identifies "agriculture security legislation" or the collective "ag-gag

9.

CHERRIE BUCKNOR, HISPANIC WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 4

(Nov.

2016), http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/hispanic-workers-2016-11.pdf.
10. IDENTIFICATION & RECRUITMENT RAPID RESPONSE CONSORTIUM, To
MIGRATE OR NOT TO MIGRATE? MOBILITY OF MIGRANT FARMWORKERS IN US

AGRICULTURE AND ITS

EFFECTS 8 (2016), http://www.idr-consortium.net/To
%20Migrate%20or%2ONot%20to%2OMigrate%20(Mobility%20in%20US%20Agri
culture%20IRRC%2OLit% 2OReview).pdf.
11. Geoffrey Heeren, The Immigrant Right to Work, 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
243, 261 (2017).
12. Jennifer J. Lee, Redefining the Legality of Undocumented Work, 106

CALIF. L. REV. 1617, 1624 (2018).
1986's definition of "authorized
employment was not "either (A)
residence, or (B) authorized to be

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of
alien" as one who with respect to their
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
so employed by this Act or by the Attorney

General." 8. U.S.C. § 1324(h)(3) (1986).

13.
14.
15.
16.

Heeren, supra note 11, at 250-51.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 257.

17.

Id. at 261.

18.
19.
20.

Id. at 261.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 261-62.
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laws" 21 as that which restrict-or "gag"-speech about the conditions
and methods of commercial food cultivation, production, or
distribution. Ag-gag laws fall into several broad categories. Most
criminalize or impose civil penalties for attempts to gain access to
farms and the use of cameras and video recorders at such facilities.
Others mandate that witnesses report legal violations to law
enforcement authorities. Legislatures have passed ag-gag laws in
nine

states,

including

Idaho, 22

Iowa, 23

Kansas, 24

Missouri, 2 5

28
Utah, 29 and
Montana, 26 North Carolina, 27 North Dakota,
30
Ag-gag laws have not entirely survived 34First
Wyoming.
33
32
31
Amendment scrutiny in Iowa, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming.
Trump could support agriculture security legislation, which
would align with his general dislike of regulation and the media and

21. Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR
(Apr. 26, 2011, 9:29 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/whoprotects-the-animals/?_r=0.
22. IDAHO CODE § 18-7042 (2018) (prohibiting interference with agricultural
production), invalidated by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d
1195, 1212 (D. Idaho. 2015), aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d. 1184, 1185 (9th Cir. 2018).
23. IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2018) (criminalizing providing false information
to gain access or employment for purposes of committing an unauthorized act),
invalidated by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, No. 4:17-cv-00362-JEGHCA, 2019 WL 140069 (S.D. Iowa 2019). See also Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Reynolds, 297 F. Supp. 3d 901 (S.D. Iowa 2018) (denying motion to dismiss).
24. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (West 2018) (criminalizing "enter[ing] an
animal facility to take pictures by photograph, video camera or by any other
means" with the intent of causing harm to the enterprise).
25. Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.013.1 (2018) (imposing duty to submit recordings of
alleged farm animal abuse within 24 hours of recording).
26. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (2017) (criminalizing entering an
animal facility with the intent to record images or take pictures for purposes of
criminal defamation).
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2 (2018) (prohibiting unauthorized entry into
nonpublic area of another's premises).
28. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21.1-02 (2017) (prohibiting entering "an animal
facility and us[ing] or attempt[ing] to use a camera, video recorder, or any other
video or audio recording equipment").
29. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(c)(i) (West 2018) (criminalizing providing
false information on an employment application with the intent to record images
at a farm), invalidated by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d
1193 (D. Utah 2017).
30. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414 (2018) (prohibiting trespassing to unlawfully
collect "resource data"), aff'd by W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 196 F. Supp.
3d 1231 (D. Wyo. 2016), rev'd by W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 869 F.3d 1189
(10th Cir. 2017).
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, No. 4:17-cv-00362-JEG-HCA,
31.
2019 WL 140069 (S.D. Iowa 2019); see also IOWA CODE § 717.A.3A; Animal Legal
Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 297 F. Supp. 3d 901 (S.D. Iowa 2018) (denying motion to
dismiss).
32. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d. 1184, 1185 (9th Cir. 2018).
33. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1195-96.
34. W. Watersheds Project, 869 F.3d at 1198.
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his expressed views about immigrants from economically struggling
countries. It is unclear whether or how Trump would respond to the
unique threat ag-gag laws pose to unauthorized farm workers, whose
rights lie at the intersection of immigration and civil rights law. 35
Trump could also choose to weigh in on the abandoned corporate
privacy rationale for Idaho's ag-gag law. 36
However, Trump's
attraction to corporate privacy might depend on whether he seeks to
exercise power as a government actor or repel government power
against private actors.
This Article recognizes how agriculture security legislation
threatens the First Amendment rights of unauthorized workers.
Threat of deportation remains a constant feature of life for
unauthorized workers, many of whom live below the U.S. poverty
line. 37 An unauthorized person who uses misrepresentations to gain
employment could be found in violation of an ag-gag law if that
worker engaged in unwanted speech about animal or agriculture
production. 38 Compliance with an ag-gag law that requires a witness
to report animal or agriculture abuse could force disclosure of
unauthorized status. 39 Once a worker's unauthorized status is
known, deportation is imminent-regardless of whether the ag-gag
investigation moves forward. 40
Part II reports on how the U.S. animal and agriculture industry
contains many risks for coercion and exploitation of unauthorized
workers. Part II profiles farm workers based on country of origin,
language skills, education, wage, risk of injuries and fatalities, and
access to health care and other public health benefits. This Part also
discusses how the unavailability of labor remedies exacerbates the
risk of coercion for those who are unauthorized.
Part III identifies how agriculture security legislation further
heightens the risk of coercion. This Part examines the work of leading
ag-gag scholars. This Part also reports on nationwide federal court
litigation. Part III demonstrates how, thus far, legal scholars and
courts have not scrutinized how ag-gag laws potentially force
disclosure of unauthorized status. Part III also points out how ag-gag
laws criminalize or impose civil penalties for misrepresentations that
unauthorized workers use to gain employment.
Part IV then theorizes how agriculture security legislation
undervalues the speech of unauthorized workers. This Part discusses
how the public nature of food production informs the First
35. Kevin R. Johnson, The End of 'CivilRights'as We Know It?: Immigration
and Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1483 (2018).

36. Oral Argument at 8:14, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d

1184 (2018) (No. 15-35960), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pk-id
=0000030477.
37. See Lee, supranote 12, at 1619.
38. See discussion infra Part III.
39. See discussion infra Part III.
40. See discussion infra Part III.
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Amendment's scope. This Part theorizes that ag-gag laws disrupt
historic and normative understandings of privacy on public matters.
Finally, Part IV advocates for an "ag-gag free" nation to mitigate the
coercive nature of unauthorized work in the U.S. animal and
agriculture industry.

II. UNAUTHORIZED WORKERS IN THE U.S. ANIMAL AND AGRICULTURE
INDUSTRY
The Pew Research Center ("Pew") estimates that as of 2014,
unauthorized workers were approximately 5% of the U.S. labor
force. 41 Pew also estimates 8 million unauthorized workers in the
United States-a number that includes those working and those
looking for work. 4 2 According to Pew, the percentage of unauthorized
immigrants in the U.S. labor force is larger than the percentage of the
total population of unauthorized immigrants, the latter which stands
at 3.5%.43 States with the top three highest shares of unauthorized
workers were Nevada, California, and Texas. 44 Pew estimates 11.1
million persons reside in the United States without authorization,
which accounts for approximately 26% of the U.S. foreign born
45
population.
There is no industry in the United States where unauthorized
persons were a majority of the total population of workers, but the
agriculture industry has the highest total percentage of unauthorized
workers. 46 Pew estimates that unauthorized persons were 17% of the
total workforce in the agriculture industry (compared to 5% for all
industries).4 7 In nineteen states, agriculture has the highest share of
48
In nine
unauthorized workers when compared to all industries.
49
states, agriculture ranks second. By another measure, in thirty-two
states farming is the occupation where unauthorized workers make
up the highest share of the workforce. 50 Unauthorized workers hold
Further,
the highest share, or 26%, of all U.S. farm jobs.51
unauthorized workers are approximately 22% of crop production

41. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEW RES. CTR. SIZE OF U.S.
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT WORKFORCE STABLE AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION:
DECLINES IN EIGHT STATES AND INCREASES IN SEVEN SINCE 2009 4 (Nov. 3, 2016),

http://www.pewhispanic.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/
-FINAL_ 11.2.16-1.pdf.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 7.
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id. at 7.
46. Id. at 7-8.
47. Id. atS.
48. Id. at 13.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 16.
51. Id. at 8.

2
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workers 52 and approximately 30% of miscellaneous agriculture
53
workers.
Reliable information about unauthorized animal and agriculture
workers is limited, but NAWS provides a broad and comprehensive
profile of U.S. crop workers. 54 NAWS is an "employment-based,
random-sample survey . . . that collects demographic, employment,
and health data in face-to-face interviews." 55 NAWS interviewees
must be currently employed in crop or crop-related work, must be
hired by an eligible establishment, and must work an eligible task. 56
NAWS interviewees do not include crop workers with an H-2A visa,
which is a temporary-employment visa for noncitizen agricultural
workers.57
NAWS may have confirmed some assumptions about
unauthorized animal and agriculture workers. NAWS revealed that
most U.S. crop workers were foreign born and that many were not
authorized to work. While 83% of NAWS interviewees identify as
Hispanic,SS 69% were born in Mexico. 59 Just more than half of all
foreign-born interviewees, 51%, reported they were authorized to
60
work in the United States.
NAWS has perhaps disproved other assumptions. On average,
foreign-born NAWS interviewees arrived in the United States
eighteen years ago, but 58% arrived fifteen years ago or sooner 61 and
78% arrived within the last ten years. 62 Only 4% of interviewees
arrived within the last year. 63
The vast majority of NAWS
interviewees, 81%, self-characterized as "settled" workers. 64 The
remaining 19% self-characterized as "migrant" workers. 65

52. Id. at 11-12.
53. Id. at 14.
54. HERNANDEZ & GABBARD, supra note 7, at i (Introduction); see also YoonKyung Chung & J. Paul Leigh, Medicaid Use by Documented and Undocumented
Farm Workers, 57 J. OCCUPATIONAL

&

ENVTL. MED. 329, 331 (2015) (describing

National Agricultural Workers Survey, or NAWS, as perhaps the only "nationally
representative sample of undocumented workers").
55. HERNANDEZ & GABBARD, supra note 7, at i (Introduction).
56.
57.

Id.

64.
65.

Id. at 1, 5.
Id.

Id; see also Fitch et. al, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that "NAWS field
interviewers must obtain permission from agricultural employers before
interviewing workers" and hypothesizing that "interviews are likely not
conducted with those working in the worst conditions").
58. Hernandez et al., supra note 7, at i (Executive Summary), 1.
59. Id. (encompassing authorized and unauthorized workers).
60. Id. at i (Executive Summary), 1, 4. Farmworker Justice estimates that
50% to 75% of U.S. animal and agriculture workers were undocumented. Fitch
et al., supra note 1, at 2.
61. HERNANDEZ & GABBARD, supra note 7, at i (Executive Summary), 3.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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NAWS revealed language disparities among foreign born U.S.
crop workers. Approximately 97% of interviewees born in Mexico and
66
Central America identified Spanish as their primary language.
Among all interviewees, 77% identified Spanish as their
language of most comfort, although 29% spoke English
conversational
"well."6 7 Among those interviewees who identified Spanish as their
68
primary language, most spoke (98%) or read (81%) Spanish "well."
Approximately 30% of all interviewees could not speak English "at
all," and 41% could speak "a little" (32%) or some English (9%).69 A
similar percentage read English "well" (28%), but 41% could not read
English "at all."70 A little over 30% read "a little" (24%) or some

English

(7%).71

Education disparities among foreign born NAWS interviewees
also exist. The average grade of formal education was eighth grade
72
Only 10% attained
but 37% completed only sixth grade or lower
73
some education beyond high school and 35% completed at least one
U.S.-based adult education class.7 4 Among interviewees born in
Mexico and other countries, seventh grade was the average highest
grade completed, compared to twelfth grade for U.S.-born
interviewees. 7 5 Only 10% of all interviewees reported some education
born NAWS
beyond high school, 76 although 18% of Mexican
77
interviewees completed twelfth grade or higher.
Little disparity exists among different types of employers. Most
78
Only
NAWS interviewees (80%) were directly hired by growers.
79
past
the
During
20% were employed by farm labor contractors.
twelve months, 80% had been hired by one employer, and the average
80
length of employment with current employers was seven years.
"Unauthorized workers were more likely than authorized workers to
have worked for more than 1 farm employer in the previous 12
On average, within twelve
months (27% compared to 14%)."81
months, interviewees reported an average of thirty-three weeks and

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

75.
76.
77.
78.

79.

Id. at 10.
Id. at ii (Executive
Id. at 11.
Id. at ii (Executive
Id.
Id.
Id. at ii (Executive
Id.
Id. at ii (Executive
Id. at 13.
Id. at ii (Executive
Id. at 13.
Id. at ii (Executive
Id.

Summary), 10.
Summary), 10.
Summary), 10, 12.
Summary), 10, 13.

Summary), 12.
Summary), 20.

80. Id. at iii (Executive Summary), 27.
81. Id. at 27.
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192-196 days of farm employment.8 2 Over three-quarters, or 76%,
expected to continue farm work for at least five years.8 3
Language, education, and other disparities are not the only
challenges for unauthorized U.S. animal and agriculture workers.
Professor Kathleen Kim discusses how immigration policy has
contributed to why "workplace coercion persists" among unauthorized
workers.8 4 Kim reveals how unauthorized workers may be unable to
freely contract their labor, which in turn implicates the Thirteenth
Amendment.8 5 Kim looks to the work of free-labor advocates and
labor jurisprudence that recognizes freedom from coercion as a
structural element of freedom of contract.8 6 For example, Professor
Maria L. Ontiveros theorizes how the "debate and treatment of
immigrant workers must be informed by the Thirteenth Amendment"
and analogizes the treatment of unauthorized workers with slaves.8 7
Ontiveros points to the U.S. political, economic, and legal systems
that severely restrict an unauthorized worker's labor, humanity,
citizenship, and civil rights.8 8 Reflecting on the "dehumanizing
rhetoric reminiscent of that used to describe slaves," Ontiveros
identifies unauthorized workers as an "exploitable group" who "often
9
labor beneath the floor."8
Kim describes how unauthorized workers in the United States
typically experience substandard wages, 90 which transforms
vulnerability into coercion. One study Kim highlights estimates a
22% general wage penalty for unauthorized status. 9 1
NAWS
interviewees lived at or near the poverty level even though the
average work week for crop workers was five days and the average
number of hours per week was forty-five. 92 NAWS interviewees
worked an average of thirty-three weeks or 63% of the calendar year

82. Id. at iii (Executive Summary), 28-29.
83. Id. at iii (Executive Summary), 32.
84. See generally Kathleen Kim, Beyond Coercion, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1558
(2018).

85. Id. at 1565-69; see also Maria Ontiveros, A Strategic Plan for Using the
Thirteenth Amendment to Protect Immigrant Workers, 27 Wis. J. L. GENDER &
SOC'Y 133, 135-43 (2012). See generally Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth
Amendment: Modern Slavery and a Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 981 (2002); Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth
Amendment and Slavery in the Global Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2002);

James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional
Law of "InvoluntaryServitude," 119 YALE L.J. 1474 (2010); Lea S. VanderVelde,
The Labor Vision of the ThirteenthAmendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437 (1989).
86. Kim, supra note 84, at 1567-68.
87. Ontiveros, supra note 85, at 135-37.
88. Id. at 139.
89. Id. at 140.
90. Kim, supra note 84, at 1570.
91. Id.; see also Nathalie Martin, Survival in the Face of Scarcity: The
Undocumented Immigrant Experience, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 103, 103 (2016).
92. HERNANDEZ & GABBARD, supranote 7, at iii (Executive Summary), 21, 27.
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on farms. 93 Most were paid by the hour (88%),94 and the average rate
of pay for all was $10.60 per hour. 95 Workers who had been with their
current employer one or two years earned an average wage of $9.89
per hour, while workers who had been with their current employer96
eleven years or more earned an average wage of $11.92 per hour.
Mean and median personal income ranged between $17,500 and
98
$19,999.97 Only 14% earned more than $30,000 of personal income.
Mean and median total family income ranged between $20,000 and
$24,999.99 Total family income also ranged: 27% reported less than
$20,000; 27% reported between $20,000 and $29,000; and 32%
reported more than $30,000.100 Among NAWS interviewees, the
likelihood of poverty increased with family size.1 01
Wage theft is particularly prevalent in farm work. The UCLA
Labor Center broadly defines wage theft as "not paying workers for
all of their work" and includes violating minimum wage laws, failing
10 2
"[A] 2012 survey of
to pay overtime, and forcing work off the clock.
New Mexico farm workers found that over two-thirds experienced
wage theft in 2011, and nearly half were paid less than the minimum
wage."10 3 Wage104theft is exacerbated by widespread practices such as
"piece-rating."
Piece-rating occurs when workers are paid "a set
amount for each piece of crop harvested[,]" which allows employers to
undermine state and federal minimum wage laws. 10 5 "[A] 2009 study
found that Oregon farm workers paid on 'piece-rate' basis earned less
than the state minimum wage .. .[most] of the time and on average
received 37% less than the minimum wage."1 06 Only 7% of NAWS
interviewees were paid by the piece,1 0 7 and they reported a slightly
higher average rate of pay ($10.58) than those paid by the hour
($10.35).108
93. Id. at 28.
94. Id. at iii (Executive Summary), 20, 21.
95. Id. at iii (Executive Summary), 20, 23.
96. Id. at 23.
97. Id. at iii (Executive Summary), 36.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 37.
102. What is Wage Theft, UCLA LAB. CTR. (May 6, 2015),
https://www.labor.ucla.edu/wage-theft/.
103. Brief of Amici Curiae United Farm Workers of America, supra note 4, at
26 (citing N.M. CTR. ON LAW & POVERTY, supra note 5).
104. Brief of Amici Curiae United Farm Workers of America, supra note 4, at
26-27 (citing U.S. Department of Labor Enforcement in Agriculture,
FARMWORKER

JUST.,

https://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/default/files

/FarmworkerJusticeDOLenforcementReport20 15%20%2810%29.pdf (last visited
Apr. 1, 2019)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. HERNANDEZ & GABBARD, supra note 7, at 21.
108. Id. at 23.
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Kim points out how the conditions for some unauthorized
workers violate health and safety laws. 10 9 Animal and agriculture
workers face an increased threat of fatalities and physical injuries
from exposure to biological dangers caused by contamination, animal
waste, and poor air quality. These health threats jeopardize the
resiliency of U.S. food system "by maintaining an unstable and
vulnerable workforce." 1 10 An unstable and vulnerable workforce
"threatens the supply and safety of food."111
Animal and agriculture work is physically toiling. 112 The Center
for Disease Control's National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health reports that in 2012 "374 farmers and agricultural workers
died from a work-related injury."113 Annually, an average of 113
persons under the age of twenty are the victims of farm-related
fatalities.114 Fatalities for agricultural workers are "7 times higher
than ... for all other workers."115 The injury rate is over 40% higher
than for all other workers. 116 Each day, hundreds of "agricultural
workers are injured to the extent that they become at least
temporarily unable to work." 117 Approximately 5% of injuries result
in "permanent impairment."' 11s In 2012 alone, 14,000 youth were
injured on farms.119 Approximately 2,700 of these injuries were due
to farm work. 120 Machinery, animals, and falls are the "major
contributing factors" for injuries among animal production and
processing workers. 121 However, researchers may have missed as
many as 77% of injuries-74% in crop production and 82% in animal
production.122
Air quality also negatively affects some agriculture workers. 123
Extreme environmental dynamics come into play, especially for crop
workers.1 24 Heat-related illnesses are four times more likely for
agriculture than nonagricultural workers. 125 Pesticide exposure is
109.

Kim, supra note 84, at 1570.

110. Fitch et al., supra note 1, at 3.
111. Id.
112. Kim, supra note 84, at 1570-71.
113. Fitch et al., supra note 1, at 10.
114. Id.
115. Brief of Amici Curiae United Farm Workers of America, supra note 4, at
12 (citing OSHA Safety and Health Topics: Agricultural Operations, DEP'T LAB.,
https://www.osha.gov/dsg/topics/agriculturaloperations/ (last visited Aug. 19,
2016)).
116. Id.
117. Fitch et al., supra note 1, at 10.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. Language barriers are also a contributing factor for injuries in
animal production and processing. Id. at 11.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 12-13.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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126
In 2011-12, 82% of
another type of illness related to air quality.
127
Nevertheless, in
NAWS interviewees received pesticide training.
2011, agricultural use of pesticides was the source of exposure in 239
128
In
of the 1,067 reported cases of pesticide-related illnesses.
California during that same year, 137 fieldworkers were injured as a
result of pesticide exposure. 129 Over a two-year period from 1998-99,
54% of pesticide-related illnesses in California were attributed to the
agriculture industry. 130 Over a seventeen-year period, farm workers
131
constituted 71% of cases of acute pesticide poisoning in California.
Air quality also significantly affects animal workers, who are
exposed to "elevated concentrations of particulate matter, endotoxins,
132
pathogens, pharmaceuticals, gases, and other health hazards."'
Animal and agriproducts may be the leading cause of foodborne
illness. 133 Recent trends suggest a lack of "progress in reducing food
borne infections."'1 34 Some strains of pathogens that cause foodborne
infection have become drug-resistant. 135 Experts at the Center for
Disease Control and Prevention warn that "even infrequent
contamination of commercially distributed products can result in
136
many illnesses."'
Some safety nets are available when harm befalls animal and
agriculture workers. Many NAWS interviewees reported that if they
were injured or sick as a result of their job, they would be covered by

126. Id. at 20-21.
127. TRISH HERNANDEZ ET AL., FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
WORKERS SURVEY (NAWS) 2011-12: A DEMOGRAPHIC AND EMPLOYMENT PROFILE OF
UNITED STATES FARMWORKERS, RESEARCH REPORT NO. 11 33 (Dec. 2016),

https://www.doleta.gov/naws/pages/research/docs[NAWSResearch
_Report_11.pdf.
128. Fitch et al., supra note 1, at 9.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 13.
133. Brief for Food & Water Watch & Center for Biological Diversity as Amici
Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 2-3, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878
F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-35960); see also Becky L. Jacobs, Urban Food
Corridors:CultivatingSustainable Cities, 91 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 215, 222-23

(2014) (discussing risks of soil contamination and remediation).
134. Brief for Food & Water Watch & Center for Biological Diversity, supra
note 133, at 5.
135. Id. (citing Ellen Silbergeld et al., Industrial Food Animal Production,
Antimicrobial Resistance, and Human Health, 29 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 151,
151-69 (2008)).
136. Brief for Food & Water Watch & Center for Biological Diversity, supra

note 133, at 6 (quoting John A. Painter et al., Attribution of FoodborneIllnesses,
Hospitalizations, and Deaths to Food Commodities by Using Outbreak Data,
United States, 1998-2008, 19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 407, 441 (2013)).
See also Laura Reily, 2018 Saw the Most Multistate Outbreaks of Foodborne
Illness in More Than a Decade, CDC Says, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2019),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/04/25/cdc-releases-its-annualreport-card-foodborne-illness-did-not-have-passing-grade/.
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workers' compensation insurance (62%).137
Fewer NAWS
interviewees were covered by health insurance (47%).138 Of those,
29% have employer provided health insurance, 43% have government
provided health insurance, and 12% self-pay.139 NAWS interviewees
reported a spouse or child with health insurance at rates of 56% and
89%, respectively. 140
Approximately 14% reported a household
member who received a benefit provided by disability and
unemployment insurance or social security.1 4 1 Of those, 10% received
payments from unemployment insurance, 1% received payments from
disability insurance, and 3% received payments from social
security.142
Unauthorized persons disproportionately seek out federal and
state publicly funded safety nets. NAWS reveals a disparity between
authorized and unauthorized workers with regard to use of public
benefits. A little over half of interviewees and their family members,
an estimated 54%, received public assistance program benefits in the
past two years. 143 Sources of benefits included Medicaid (44%), WIC
(17%), and SNAP (18%).144
In 2013-14, unauthorized NAWS
interviewees used a higher percentage of three types of public
benefits: (1) WIC benefits (27% for unauthorized workers versus 11%
for authorized workers); (2) food stamps (19% for unauthorized
workers versus 13% for authorized workers); and (3) public health
clinics (12% of unauthorized workers versus 7% of authorized
workers). 145 Another study found unauthorized persons use a lesser
percentage of Medicaid benefits-by 10.4%-when compared to
authorized farm workers. 146 "[T]he odds of childless unauthorized
households receiving Medicaid benefits were 13% that of childless
authorized households." 147
Parenthood increases the odds of
Medicaid use in all households, but the odds ratios were "strongly
statistically significant" for unauthorized farm workers (8.4%
greater) and authorized farm workers (6.57% greater). 148
The unavailability of labor law remedies exacerbate other issues,
including the language and education disparities, low wages, and
HERNANDEZ & GABBARD, supra note 7, at iii
(Executive Summary), 25.
138. Id. at iv (Executive Summary), 40.
139. Id. at iv (Executive Summary), 41.
140. Id. at iv (Executive Summary), 42.
141. Id. at iv (Executive Summary), 39.

137.

142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id.

145. TRISH HERNANDEZ ET AL., FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
WORKERS SURVEY (NAWS) 2013-14: A DEMOGRAPHIC AND EMPLOYMENT PROFILE OF
UNITED STATES FARMWORKERS, RESEARCH REPORT No. 12 39 (Dec. 2016),

https://www.doleta.gov/naws/pages/researchdocs/NAWSResearchReport

_12.pdf.
146. Chung & Leigh, supra note 54, at 331.
147.

Id. at 332.

148.

Id.
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health and safety risks that increase an unauthorized person's
vulnerability to coercion. 149 In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB,150 the Supreme Court declared that back pay awards to some
15 1
unauthorized

workers undermined

federal immigration policy.

Kim describes Hoffman as imposing a "comparative culpability"
theory of analysis. 152 The plaintiffs culpability "tends to show his
153
Likewise, the
complicity in the unauthorized work arrangement."
plaintiffs "freely given" consent to unlawful employment nullifies the
155
the United
right to a full statutory remedy. 154 In Palma v. NLRB,
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit extended Hoffman to
"categorically exclude unauthorized workers from receiving back pay
awards even if false documents were not used to obtain
employment."

156

So far Hoffman has been limited to the National Labor Relations
Act, 157 but the effect would be particularly acute for female
unauthorized workers if harassment and discrimination laws were
also unavailable. 158 The majority of NAWS interviewees, or 68% of
159
farm workers, identified as male.

Ontiveros has chronicled how

female farm workers report a high rate of harassment and unwanted
sexual attention. 160 A January 2010 study of 150 female workers in
149. See Kim, supra note 84, at 1579-80; see also Keith CunninghamParmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV.
1361, 1366-71 (2009) (discussing the eroding labor rights of unauthorized
immigrants); Jarod S. Gonzalez, Employment Law Remedies for Illegal
Immigrants, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 987, 989-93 (2008) (surveying the current
employment law remedies for illegal immigrants); Lee, supra note 12, at 162425 (discussing how the lack of legal remedies and threat of immigration
enforcement "facilitates employer coercion").
150. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
151. Id. at 151-52.
152. Kim, supra note 84, at 1579-80.
153. Id. at 1580.
154.

Id.

155. 723 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2013).
156. Id. at 185.
157. See U.S. Dep't Labor, Fact Sheet #48: Application of U.S. Labor Laws to
Immigrant Workers: Effect of Hoffman Plastics Decision on Laws Enforced by the
https://www.dol.gov/whd/
(2008),
Division,
Hour
and
Wage
regs/compliance/whdfs48.pdf.
158. See generally Ambrosi v. 1085 Park Ave. LLC, No. 06-CV-8163(BSJ),
2008 WL 4386751, at *11-14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008); Hernandez-Cortez v.
Hernandez, No. Civ. A. 01-1241-JTM, 2003 WL 22519678, at *5-7 (D. Kan. Nov.
4, 2003); Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1334-37 (M.D.
Fla. 2003); Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 263, 272, 275 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2011), rev'd in part, 59 Cal. 4th 407 (Cal. 2014); Rosa v. Partners in Progress,
Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1001-02 (N.H. 2005).
159. HERNANDEZ & GABBARD, supra note 7, at i (Executive Summary), 7.
160. Maria L. Ontiveros, Lessons from the Fields: Female Farmworkers and
the Law, 55 ME. L. REV. 157, 169 (2003); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
CULTIVATING FEAR: THE VULNERABILITY OF IMMIGRANT FARMwORKERS IN THE US
(2012),
23-31
3-5,
HARASSMENT
SEXUAL
AND
VIOLENCE
SEXUAL
TO

http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0512ForUpload-1.pdf;

Robin R.
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central California revealed an 80% rate of sexual harassment. 161
Many of these women reported their supervisors constantly grabbed,
touched, propositioned, or demanded sex as a requirement to keep
their job.162 The risks for female farm workers who share their
experience of sexual harassment with other supervisors and
managers are significant.
Many reported reduced hours and
termination after doing so. 163 "The socio-economic status of female
farm workers and their desperate need for a job and an income cannot
be overlooked" when discussing the risks for those who speak out
against abuse. 164 Many women work with a spouse or other members
of their family, 165 thus retaliation can extend broadly. 166
Fear of deportation is a defining feature of existence for many
unauthorized workers in the United States and can also contribute to
a coercive environment. 167
Professor Jennifer Lee presents
unauthorized workers as an "underclass" who are "trapped between"
"illegal and legal spaces." 168 Lee offers a number of immigration
consequences besides deportation. 16 9 Eligibility for asylum can be
denied, as can eligibility for an adjustment of status. 170 Federal
immigration law prohibits employers from hiring workers without
authorization 171 and prohibits the use of false documents to verify
immigration status. 172 Employers are tasked with verifying an
employee's documents through the 1-9 process. 173 Kim and others
describe how the 1-9 process has transformed private workplaces into
offices of federal immigration enforcement. 174
Runge, Failing to Address Sexual and Domestic Violence at Work: The Case of
Migrant Farmworker Women, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 871, 877

(2012) (describing extent of sexual harassment and assault among female farm
workers).
161. Irma Morales Waugh, Examining the Sexual Harassment Experiences of

Mexican Immigrant Farmworking Women, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 237,
241 (2010).
162. Ontiveros, supranote 160, at 169.
163. Runge, supra note 152, at 877.
164. Id. at 885.
165. Id. at 877-78.
166. Id.
167. See Lee, supra note 12, at 1624-25; see also Shannon Gleeson, Labor
Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for Worker Claims
Making, 35 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 561 (2010) (examining the justifications that
undocumented workers provide for not making work-related claims).
168. Lee, supra note 12, at 1624-28.
169. Id. at 1624-25.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1624.
172. Id.
173. Id.; see also Kim, supra note 84, at 1576-77 (discussing the use of
E-Verify as an enforcement tool).
174. Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 1103, 1104-05 (2009); see also Julie Braker, Navigating the Relationship

Between the DHS and the DOL: The Need for Federal Legislation to Protect
Immigrant Workers' Rights, 46 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 329, 329 (2013)
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Kim discusses how fear of deportation increases self-censorship
about work conditions. 175 Lee details how fear of deportation allows
employers to exploit unauthorized workers "by paying them less than
' 176
the legal requirements or employing them in unsafe conditions."
Unauthorized workers are likely to experience 61,000% more
workplace injuries and 300 more workplace fatalities than U.S. native
One survey reported that almost one half of
born workers. 177
unauthorized female workers experienced a minimum wage
178
violation.
Reflecting on this type of structural coercion, Kim urges
consideration of how immigration laws "create and maintain power
179
Hoffman
inequities between employers and their workers."
demonstrates how federal immigration law yields to federal labor
law.18 0 Kim also points out how immigration laws allow employers to
contact local law enforcement or U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement l8 l against an unauthorized worker who speaks out
about workplace abuses.1 8 2 The Trump Administration could further
marginalize undocumented workers and prioritize deportation over
investigation of possible workplace violations.
Power inequities that essentially prevent speech about work
conditions run counter to the First Amendment. In United States v.
Alvarez, 183 the Court reflected how the First Amendment encouraged
"more speech, not enforced silence" on issues to promote the
unfettered exchange of ideas. 8 4 Leading food law scholars recently
joined to theorize about how the marketplace of ideas helps
consumers "sort out" commercial messaging. 185 This marketplace
186
functions inefficiently when there is a lack of "diversity of voices."
Consumer interest about "where their food comes from" has

(discussing the effect of immigration enforcement on workers' rights); Kim, supra
note 84, at 1576-77 (discussing "employer's role as immigration officer"); Lee,
supra note 12, at 1624 (describing the 1-9 requirements imposed on employers).
175. Kim, supra note 84, at 1573-78; see also Lee, supra note 12, at 1625.
176.

Lee, supra note 12, at 1625.

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Kim, supra note 84, at 1582.
180. Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going
Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 737, 746-52 (2003).
181. Lee, supra note 12, at 1625; see also Kim, supra note 84, at 1573-78.
182. Lee, supra note 12, at 1625; see also Kim, supra note 84, at 1573-78.

183. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
184. Id. at 727-28 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citing Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 377 (1927)).
185. Brief of Amici Curiae Food Law and Policy Scholars in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees Animal Legal Def. Fund, et al. at 11-12, Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-35960).
186. Id.
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increased.187 Research confirms demand for more transparency at
every leve 18 8 and consumer interest in the "free flow of commercial
information" about food production is often sparked by expos6s. 18 9
"[C]onsumers likewise recognize and appreciate the vital information
that journalists, whistleblowers, and activists have to share about"
the industry.90
Next, this Article identifies how "agriculture security legislation"
or "ag-gag laws"1 9 1 potentially restrict an unauthorized worker's
speech about the conditions and methods of food cultivation,
production, or distribution. Many ag-gag laws criminalize or impose
civil penalties for the use of misrepresentations to gain employment
at a food production facility. Other ag-gag laws require witnesses to
report animal or agriculture misconduct to law enforcement.1 92
Trump could embrace ag-gag laws, especially given his general dislike
of regulation and the media and his disparaging comments about
unauthorized persons and members of the Latino community.
III. AGRICULTURE SECURITY LEGISLATION
Agriculture security legislation gags the speech and press rights
of food journalists and farm workers who have information about an
animal or agribusiness's production, operation, or work conditions.
Neither the First Amendment nor the Restatement (Second) of Torts
recognizes a "personal right of privacy" for corporations,
partnerships, or unincorporated associations. 193 Without ag-gag

187. Id. at 5; see also Jacobs, supra note 133, at 229-30 (discussing how
approximately 15% "of the world's food is grown in urban areas," but how "the
U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated that demand for locally grown food
would rise from the $4 billion market in 2002 to a $7 billion market in 2012").
188. Brief of Amici Curiae Food Law and Policy Scholars, supra note 185, at
5, 12 (quoting Nicole Negowetti, Opening the Barnyard Door: Transparencyand
the Resurgence of Ag-Gag & Veggie Libel Laws, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1345, 1373
(2015)); see also Peter Wendel, Distressed Cities and Urban Farming: Are We
Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill?, 91 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 277, 283-85
(2014) (discussing the overlap between urban farming and the environmental
movement and describing urban farming as "the quintessential 'locally grown'
food").
189. Brief of Amici Curiae Food Law and Policy Scholars, supra note 185, at
13 (citing Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 765 (1976)).
190. Brief of Amici Curiae Food Law and Policy Scholars, supra note 185, at
18.
191. Bittman, supra note 21.
192. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-7042 (2016) (prohibiting interference with
agricultural production), invalidatedby Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F.
Supp. 3d 1195, 1212 (D. Idaho. 2015), aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Animal
Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d. 1184 (2018); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 578.013.1
(2016) (imposing duty to submit recordings of alleged farm animal abuse within
24 hours of recording).
193. FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 406 (2011) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 cmt. c (1976)).
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laws, the corporate privacy rights of agribusinesses would be limited
to the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
government searches and seizures and state and federal laws that
protect trade secrets and other propriety information.1 94 In contrast,
with ag-gag laws an agribusiness potentially controls all information
195
about their operation, production, and work conditions.
So far, Amy Meyer appears to be the only person charged with
violating any state's ag-gag law. 196 While driving near the Dale Smith
Meatpacking Company in Draper City, Utah, 197 Meyer pulled to the
side of the public road and took video of cows through a barbed-wire
fence. 198 Meyer observed a sick or injured live cow being carried away
in a tractor "as though she were nothing more than rubble." 199 A
slaughterhouse manager saw Meyer and informed her she could not
film. 20 0 Meyer resisted because she was on public land, at least until
law enforcement responded to a claim of trespass. 20 1 The official
report noted the lack of damage to any property. 20 2 A judge later
case, 203 yet Meyer reported the experience left a
dismissed Meyer's
"chilling effect." 20 4 Meyer, along with others, later successfully
argued in federal court that Utah's ag-gag law violated the First
20 5
Amendment.
Ag-gag laws can prevent an unauthorized worker from reporting
a credible claim of animal or agriculture abuse or workplace and
environmental violations. As previously noted, ag-gag laws fall into
several broad categories. Most criminalize or impose civil penalties
for the use of misrepresentations to gain access to or employment at
an animal or agriculture farm or facility. 20 6 Others require reports of
animal, agriculture, environmental, and other abuses to law
194. Mary D. Fan, Private Data, Public Safety: A Bounded Access Model of
Disclosure, 94 N.C. L. REV. 161, 173 (2015).

195. See Bittman, supra note 21.
196. Will Potter, First 'Ag-Gag" Prosecution: Utah Woman Filmed a
Slaughterhouse from the Public Street, GREEN IS NEW RED (Apr. 29, 2013),
http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/first-ag-gag-arrest-utah-amymeyer/6948/.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1200 (D. Idaho.
2015).
204. Marissa Lang, Judge Won't Toss Suit Challenging Utah's Ag-Gag'Law,
SALT LAKE TR. (Aug. 7, 2014, 9:08 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref

=/sltrib/news/58267614- 78/law-animal-plaintiffs-utah.html.csp.
205. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1198-99, 1213
(D. Utah 2017).
206. Sonia Weil, Big-Ag Exceptionalism: Ending the Special Protection of the
Agricultural Industry, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 183, 185-86 (2017) (discussing ag-gag

legislation that criminalizes undercover investigations).
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enforcement. 207 Another major group, and one that leads to extensive
litigation, are those laws that prohibit the use of cameras and video
recorders at facilities without permission. 208 State legislatures have
passed ag-gag laws in

Idaho, 209 Iowa, 210 Kansas,2

11

Missouri, 212

Montana, 2 13
2 17

North Carolina, 214 North Dakota, 2 15 Utah, 2 16 and
Wyoming.
The interests that agriculture security legislation protect could
be interpreted as relating to "securing" real and commerc"al property.
But specific state laws highlight an intent to do more than "secure"
real and commercial property. Iowa was one of the first states to pass
an ag-gag law. Iowa criminalized providing false information to gain
access or employment, 218 which could have directly implicated some
207. Chip Gibbons, CTR. FOR
AG-GAG
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2
(2017),
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/
files/attach/2017/09/Ag-GagAcrossAmerica.pdf.
208. Challenging North Carolina's Ag-Gag Law, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND
(Dec. 19, 2018), https://aldf.org/case/challenging-north-carolinas-ag-gag-law/.
209. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (West 2016) (prohibiting interference with
agricultural production), invalidated by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F.
Supp. 3d 1195, 1212 (D. Idaho 2015), aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Animal
Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018).
210. IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A (West 2016) (criminalizing providing false
information to gain access or employment for purposes of committing an
unauthorized act), invalidated by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, No. 4:17cv-00362-JEG-HCA, 2019 WL 140069 (S.D. Iowa 2019).
211. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (West 2015) (criminalizing "enter[ing] an
animal facility to take pictures by photograph, video camera or by any other
means" with the intent of causing harm to the enterprise).
212. Mo. ANN. STAT. §578.013.1 (West 2016) (imposing duty to submit
recordings of alleged farm animal abuse within 24 hours of recording).
213. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (West 2015) (criminalizing entering
an animal facility with the intent to record images or take pictures for purposes
of criminal defamation).
214. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99A-2 (West 2015) (prohibiting unauthorized
entry into nonpublic area of another's premises).
215. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West 2012) (prohibiting entering
an animal facility and us[ing] or attempt[ing] to use a camera, video recorder, or
any other video or audio recording equipment").
216. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(c)(i) (West 2012) (criminalizing providing
false information on an employment application with the intent to record images
at a farm), invalidated by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d
1193 (D. Utah 2017).
217. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414 (West 2015) (prohibiting trespassing to
unlawfully collect "resource data"), a/f'd by W. Watersheds Project v. Michael,
196 F. Supp. 3d 1231 (D. Wyo. 2016), rev'd by W. Watersheds Project v. Michael,
869 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2017).
218. IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A (West 2016) (defining agriculture production
facility fraud in part as follows: "a false statement or representation as part of an
application or agreement to be employed at an agricultural production facility, if
the person knows the statement to be false, and makes the statement with an
intent to commit an act not authorized by the owner of the agricultural
production facility, knowing that the act is not authorized.").
WHISTLEBLOWERS
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unauthorized workers. Kansas criminalizes "enter[ing] an animal
facility to take pictures by photograph, video camera or by any other
219
Missouri
means" with the intent of causing harm to the enterprise.
imposes a duty to submit recordings of alleged farm animal abuse
Montana criminalizes entering an
within twenty-four hours. 220
animal facility with the intent to record images or take pictures for
purposes of criminal defamation. 22 1 North Carolina imposes civil
liability for unauthorized entry into nonpublic areas of another's
premises. 222 North Dakota prohibits entering an animal facility and
219. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c) (2018) ("No person shall, without the
effective consent of the owner and with the intent to damage the enterprise
conducted at the animal facility ... enter an animal facility to take pictures by
photograph, video camera or by any other means."). KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1828(a)
("Any person who has been damaged by reason of a violation of K.S.A. 471827 ...may bring an action in the district court against the person causing the
damage to recover: . . . [a]n amount equal to three times all actual and

consequential damages ... and court costs and reasonable attorney fees.").
220. Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.013.1 (2016) ("Whenever any farm animal
professional videotapes or otherwise makes a digital recording of what he or she
believes to depict a farm animal subjected to abuse or neglect . . . such farm
animal professional shall have a duty to submit such videotape or digital
recording to a law enforcement agency within twenty-four hours of the recording."
Intentional violations of this statute constitute a class A misdemeanor.). See also
id. § 578.013.3.
221. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (2017) ("A person who does not have
the effective consent of the owner and who intends to damage the enterprise
conducted at an animal facility may not: . . .enter an animal facility to take
pictures by photograph, video camera, or other means with the intent to commit
criminal defamation."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-104 ("A person who has been
damaged by reason of a violation of 81-30-103 may bring against the person who
caused the damage an action in the district court to recover. . . an amount equal
to three times all actual and consequential damages 0 and . . .court costs and
reasonable attorney fees."). MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-105 imposes criminal
penalties for violations of § 81-30-103.
222. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2(a) (2018) provides that:
"[a]ny person who intentionally gains access to the nonpublic areas of
another's premises and engages in an act that exceeds the person's
authority to enter those areas is liable to the owner or operator of the
premises for any damages sustained. For the purposes of this section,
'nonpublic areas' shall mean those areas not accessible to or not
intended to be accessed by the general public." Section 99A-2(b) defines
"an act that exceeds a person's authority to enter the nonpublic areas
of another's premises [as] any of the following: (1) An employee who
enters the nonpublic areas of an employer's premises for a reason other
than a bona fide intent of seeking or holding employment or doing
business with the employer and thereafter without authorization
captures or removes the employer's data, paper, records, or any other
documents and uses the information to breach the person's duty of
loyalty to the employer; [or,] (2) An employee who intentionally enters
the nonpublic areas of an employer's premises for a reason other than
a bona fide intent of seeking or holding employment or doing business
with the employer and thereafter without authorization records images
or sound occurring within an employer's premises and uses the
recording to breach the person's duty of loyalty to the employer; [or,] (3)
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using or attempting to use a camera, video recorder, or any other
video or audio recording equipment.223
Professors Alan Chen and Justin Marceau are the leading
scholars on agriculture security legislation, 224 but their research does
not directly address how ag-gag laws implicate unauthorized
workers. Instead, Chen and Marceau discuss how video recording
furthers the First Amendment values of self-governance, the search
for truth, and the promotion of public discourse. 225 They innovatively
theorize about how ag-gag laws implicate democracy in the video age
by keeping agribusiness "operations out of view of a camera." 226 Their
scholarship also advocates a constitutional right to record, and they
discuss the need to protect individuals from civil or criminal liability
for some recordings. 227 Their research identifies recording as a
component preparatory to expression and speech, not mere
conduct.228 Finally, they distinguish between recording in public and
private and conclude that "nothing about the private setting
fundamentally changes the conceptual understating of the expressive
229
nature of recording."

Knowingly or intentionally placing on the employer's premises an
unattended camera or electronic surveillance device and using that
device to record images or data."
Section 99A-2(d) allows a court to:
award to a party who prevails in an action brought pursuant to this
section one or more of the following remedies: (1) Equitable relief[;] (2)
Compensatory damages as otherwise allowed by State or federal law[;]
(3) Costs and fees, including reasonable attorneys' fees[; and] (4)
Exemplary damages as otherwise allowed by State or federal law in the
amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each day, or portion
thereof, that a defendant has acted in violation of [section 99A-2(a)].
223. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21.1-02 (2017) ("No person without the effective
consent of the owner may. . . [e]nter an animal facility and use or attempt to use
a camera, video recorder, or any other video or audio recording equipment.").
224. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, Developinga Taxonomy of Lies
Under the FirstAmendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 655 (2018) [hereinafter Chen &
Marceau, Developing a Taxonomy]; Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value
Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435 (2015)
[hereinafter Chen & Marceau, High Value Lies]; Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen,
Free Speech and Democracy in the Video Age, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 991 (2016)
[hereinafter Marceau & Chen, Free Speech]; Justin F. Marceau, Ag Gag Past,
Present, and Future,38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1317 (2015) [hereinafter Marceau, Ag

Gag].
225. Marceau & Chen, Free Speech, supra note 224 at 999-1017; see also
Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 167, 180
(2017).
226. Brief for Amici Curiae Association of American Publishers et al. in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 16, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878
F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-35960); see also Marceau & Chen, Free Speech,
supra note 224, at 1009, 1023-25.
227. Marceau & Chen, Free Speech, supra note 224, at 1026-41.
228. Id. at 1017-23.
229. Id. at 1023-24.
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Chen and Marceau emphasize the false speech analysis from
Alvarez, which places unauthorized workers in a precarious position
because of the financial or material gain that results from
230
In Alvarez, a
misrepresentations used to gain employment.
plurality of the Court extended First Amendment protection to false
speech. 2 31 Alvarez involved a prosecution under the Stolen Valor Act,
which made it a federal crime to falsely claim receipt of a military
honor or declaration. 232 During his first public meeting as a water
district board member, Alvarez made three false claims: (1) that he
formerly played for the Detroit Red Wings; (2) that he once married a
starlet from Mexico; and (3) that he received a Congressional Medal
23 3
of Honor.
Chen and Marceau argue that under Alvarez, "high value lies"
234
They identify
warrant more robust First Amendment protection."
23 5
and explain
investigative deceptions as a type of "high value lie"
how Alvarez extended First Amendment protection to false speech
that caused no legally cognizable harm. 236 Alvarez remarked how the
Stolen Valor Act allowed unlimited government control over one
237
The Act did protect a
subject at any time or in any setting.
compelling interest-recognizing and expressing gratitude for acts of
238
The
heroism and sacrifice--but was insufficiently tailored.
government was unable to show that public perception of military
was
honors and declarations had diminished or that the government
23 9
unable to counter Alvarez's false speech with the truth.
Chen, Marceau, and others, including local ACLU affiliates and
animal rights groups, tested the Alvarez false speech analysis in
several federal court challenges against agriculture security
legislation. In the first of these cases, a federal district court found
240
Section 18-7042
Idaho's ag-gag law violated the First Amendment.
230. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718-21 (2012); see also Chen &
Marceau, High Value Lies, supra note 224, at 1451-54.

231. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 709.
232. Id. at 715-17.
233. Id. at 713-15.
234. See Chen & Marceau, High Value Lies, supra note 224, at 1480-91; see

also Chen & Marceau, Developing a Taxonomy, supra note 224, at 692-97.

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Chen & Marceau, High Value Lies, supra note 224, at 1455-1506.
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724-30.
Id. at 722-24.
Id. at 724-25.
Id. at 726-28.
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1202 (D. Idaho

2015), aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878

F.3d. 1184 (9th Cir. 2018). The District of Idaho ruled on pre-trial motions that
section 18-7042 was a content-based restriction on speech. Id. at 1202. On
summary judgment, Idaho argued that section 18-7042 should be limited to apply
only to false speech amounting to actionable fraud, defamation, conversion, or
trespass. Id. at 1203. Idaho's chief district judge disagreed. Id. Section 18-7042
prohibited all lies regardless of whether those lies caused any material harm. Id.
Section 18-7042 also prohibited the use of lies or misrepresentations to gain
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of the Idaho Code criminalized interference with production at any
animal or agricultural facility, which included "any structure or land,
whether privately or publicly owned, leased or operated, that is being
used for agricultural production."' 24 1 For purposes of section 18-7042,
animal and '[a]gricultural production' refers to activities associated
with the production of agricultural products for food, fiber, fuel and

other lawful uses." 242 Idaho prohibited using misrepresentations to
(1) enter an agricultural facility, 243 (2) enter and make unauthorized

audio or video recordings, 244 (3) obtain records, 24 5 or (4) obtain
employment with an intent to cause economic or other injury. 246
Idaho also imposed the most restrictive penalties for violating ag-gag
laws: punishment ranged up to one year in jail and damages
measured up to twice the economic loss to a business. 247 The
legislative history of section 18-7042 revealed that some members of
the legislature wanted to prevent undercover investigations into
Idaho's agricultural industry. 248
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed
with most of Chen and Marceau's reasoning that Alvarez left false
speech unprotected if "made 'for the purpose of material gain' or
'material advantage,' or if such speech inflicts a 'legally cognizable
harm."' 24 9

On this basis, the Ninth Circuit invalidated section

18-7042(1)(a), which prohibited misrepresentations to gain entry, and
section 18-7042(1)(d), which prohibited nonconsensual audio and
video recordings. 250 The Ninth Circuit agreed that the prohibition
against misrepresentations to gain entry potentially criminalized
access to information relevant to a report on truthful activities. Id. at 1204. The
court also found that "[elven where reporting was truthful (and thus, no action
for fraud or defamation would apply), section 18-7042 would still impose criminal
liability." Id. at 1203-04. As a result, a report on the facility itself, not the
representations made to gain access to that facility, was the most likely harm
from activity in violation of section 18-7042. Id. at 1204. The court held that
harm caused by truthful reporting is not a legally cognizable harm absent special
circumstances and hypothesized that The Jungle would have triggered criminal
charges against Sinclair were he subjected to Idaho's privacy legislation. Id. at
1201-02 (citing WILLIAM A. BLOODWORTH, JR., UPTON SINCLAIR 45-48 (1977)); see
also UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906). Finally, the court reasoned commercial
agricultural operations were not exclusively private matters because modern food
production was a heavily regulated industry. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter,
118 F. Supp. 3d at 1202, 1207.
241. IDAHO CODE § 18-7042 (2018).
242. Id. § 18-7042(2)(a).
243. Id. § 18-7042(1)(a).
244. Id. § 18-7042(1)(d).
245. Id. § 18-7042(1)(b).
246. Id. § 18-7042(1)(c).
247. Id. § 18-7042(3); see also Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp.
3d 1195, 1200-01 (D. Idaho. 2015).
248. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1200-01.
249. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 719, 723 (2012); see Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d. 1184, 1194 (9th Cir. 2018).
250. Animal Legal Def. Fund v.Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1194-99, 1203-05.
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innocent behavior to a staggering degree and that no material benefit
25 1
Idaho's prohibition targeted
was always associated to the speaker.
journalists and other investigative reporters, which could chill lawful
speech. 252 Idaho's prohibition against misrepresentations to gain
access was so broad that it gave rise to suspicion of an impermissible
purpose. 253 The Ninth Circuit also deemed Idaho's prohibition
against recording an obvious content-based restriction on speech that
ultimately implicated the First Amendment right to film matters of
public interest. 25 4 In this respect, the recording prohibition was both
under- and over-inclusive. Subsection (1)(d) prohibited only audio
255
The
and video recordings but said nothing about photographs.
prohibition also suppressed more speech than necessary, due to the
vast number of available legal remedies that did not implicate the
256
First Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit's revival of subsections 18-7042(1)(b) and 187042(1)(c) offers a clue as to the types of misrepresentations Alvarez
leaves unprotected. Subsection (b) prohibited misrepresentations to
to
obtain records and subsection (c) prohibited misrepresentations 257
gain employment with intent to cause economic or other injury.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the use of misrepresentations to
obtain records "wreaks actual and potential harm on a facility and
The use of
gain on the fibber." 258
material
bestows
misrepresentations to gain employment and with an intent to cause
economic or other injury was not an overly broad prohibition on
259
Instead, the prohibition
speech or speech creation activities.
dealing that was implied
enforces the covenant of good faith and fair
26 0
in all of Idaho's employment agreements.
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Idaho, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit remanded Wyoming's ag-gag
law back to the federal district court for a First Amendment analysis,
26 1
Wyoming
leaving open the question of whether Alvarez applied.

Id. at 1195-96.
Id. at 1197-98.
Id. at 1198.
Id. at 1203-05.
Id. at 1204.
Id. at 1205.
Id. at 1199-1203.
Id. at 1199-1202.
Id.
Id.
W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1235 (D. Wyo.
rev'd by W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 869 F.3d 1189, 1198 (10th Cir.
2017). See also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414(a) (2017) (providing "that [a] person is
guilty of trespassing to unlawfully collect resource data if he [e]nters onto open
land for the purpose of collecting resource data; and [d]oes not have [a]n
ownership interest in the real property or, statutory, contractual or other legal
authorization to enter or access the land to collect resource data or [w]ritten or
verbal permission of the owner, lessee or agent of the owner to enter or access the
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
2016),
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imposed criminal punishment and civil liability for trespassing on
private land for purposes of gathering "resource data."262 Resource

data included all that related "to land or land use, including but not
limited to data regarding agriculture, minerals, geology, history,
cultural artifacts, archeology, air, water, soil, conservation, habitat,
vegetation, or animal species." 263

Wyoming criminalized entering

private land "for the purpose of collecting resource data" and crossing
private land to collect resource data from adjacent or proximate
land. 26

4

Elsewhere in the Tenth Circuit, a coalition of plaintiffs

challenged an ag-gag law in Utah that more closely resembled the
Idaho law. 2 5 Section 76-6-112 of the Utah Code applied only to
facilities that were exclusively located on private property 266 and
broadly criminalized interfering with an "agricultural operation." 2 67
Section 76-6-112 contained one lying provision and three recording
provisions.268
Utah criminalized (1) "bugging an agricultural
operation;" 26 9 (2) "obtaining access to an agricultural operation under

land to collect the specified resource data"); Section 6-3-414(d) (punishing the
unlawful collection of resource data by "imprisonment for not more than one (1)
year, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both" and by
"imprisonment for not less than ten (10) days nor more than one (1) year, a fine
of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or both, if the person has
previously been convicted of trespassing to unlawfully collect resource data or
unlawfully collecting resource data."). Moreover, "[n]o resource data collected in
violation of this section is admissible in evidence in any civil, criminal or
administrative proceeding, other than a prosecution for violation of this section
or a civil action against the violator." Id. at § 6-3-414(f). Additionally, "[r]esource
data collected in violation of this section in the possession of any governmental
entity... shall be expunged by the entity from all files and data bases, and it
shall not be considered in determining any agency action." Id. § 6-3-414(g). For
a thorough analysis of Wyoming's ag-gag law, see generally Carrie Scrufari, A
Watershed Moment Revealing What's at Stake: How Ag-Gag Statues Could
Impair Data Collection and Citizen Participationin Agency Rulemaking, 65
UCLA L. REV. DIsc. 2 (2017).
262. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414 (2017); WYO.STAT. ANN. § 40-27-101 (2017).
263.

WYO. STAT. ANN.

§ 6-3-414(e)(iv)

(2017);

WYO. STAT. ANN.

§ 40-27-

101(h)(iii) (2017); W, Watersheds Project, 869 F.3d at 1192.
264. WYO.STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414(a)-(c); 40-27-101(a)-(c).
265. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193,1199 (D. Utah
2017). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 (2017), which provides that:
[a] person is guilty of agricultural operation interference if the person[,]
without consent from the owner of the 0 operation, or the owner's agent,
knowingly or intentionally records an image of, or sound from, the
operation: (a) while the person is on the property where the agricultural
operation is located; or (b) by leaving a recording device on the property
where the agricultural operation is located.
Individuals who commit agricultural operation interference are guilty of a class
A misdemeanor for the first offense. Id.
266. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(1) (2012).
267. Id. at § 76-6-112(2).
268. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1198.
269. Id.
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false pretenses;" 270 (3) "filming an agricultural operation after
27 1
and (4) "filming an
applying for a position with the intent to film;"
272
trespassing."
agricultural operation while
The Tenth Circuit focused on how Wyoming's agriculture security
legislation, which regulated conduct on private property, implicated
According to the Tenth Circuit's
the First Amendment. 273
examination of jurisprudence, the First Amendment protection for
2 74
"the creation and dissemination of information" applied even where
only one aspect of the challenged legislation concerned private
property. 2 75 The gathering of facts was deemed "the beginning point"
for conducting human affairs and was "most essential to advance
human knowledge." 276 Wyoming could not escape First Amendment
scrutiny by "simply proceeding upstream and damming the source of
Collecting samples, noting legal descriptions, and
speech." 277
recording geographical coordinates informs advocacy and other forms
of protected expression. 2 78 Wyoming also punished speech-creation
27 9
activities differently than activities that created no speech.
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit remanded Wyoming's ag-gag law for a
First Amendment analysis. 28 0 Utah abandoned its ag-gag law after
had already
the Tenth Circuit's remand. 28 1 A federal district 2court
82
barred enforcement on First Amendment grounds.
Neither the Ninth or Tenth Circuits addressed how Alvarez
applies to undocumented workers, many of whom gain employment
through oral and written misrepresentations. While little in the
legislative record of ag-gag laws reflects a desire to target
unauthorized workers, the implications should not be ignored in light
of the extreme coercive environment that exists for those who can be
threatened with deportation. Next, this Article explores how a robust
recognition of First Amendment rights for unauthorized workers can

271.

Id.
Id.

272.
273.

Id.
W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 869 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2017).

270.

Wyoming supported the interpretation that its legislation regulated conduct on
public land if "an individual first trespasses on private land." Id.
274. Id. at 1196.
275. Id. at 1195.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See id. at 1196-97.
279. Id. at 1194.
280. Id. at 1198.

281.

See Tiffany Caldwell, Utah to Pay Animal Welfare Groups $349,000 to

Settle 'Ag-Gag' Lawsuit, SALT LAKE TR. (Nov. 18, 2017), https://www.sltrib.com
/news/2017/11/18/utah-to-pay-animal-welfare-groups-349000-to-settle-ag-gaglawsuit/.
282. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1213 (D. Utah
2017).
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help mitigate the coercive environment
often-ignored class of workers.

that

exists

for

this
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Not all agribusiness owners were in favor of agriculture security
legislation, although none specifically mentioned the First
Amendment implications for unauthorized workers in the industry.
Hamdi Ulukaya urged Governor Butch Otter to veto Idaho's ag-gag
law. 28 3 Ulukaya is the founder and chief executive officer of Chobani,
which opened a major Greek yogurt plant in the Idaho in 2013.284
Ulukaya publicly stated, in part: "A bill is up for approval in Idaho
that, if passed, would limit transparency and make some instances of
exposing the mistreatment of animals . . . punishable by
imprisonment. This could cause the general public concern and
conflicts with our views and values." 28 5
Ag-gag litigation has
extended beyond the U.S. Mountain West. In 2018, a federal district
court in Iowa denied a motion to dismiss a challenge to an ag-gag
law. 28 6 In January 2019, that same court ruled Iowa's ag-gag law
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. 28 7 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit revived on standing grounds
an ag-gag lawsuit in North Carolina. 28 8 As discussed in Part III,
federal courts were able to decide the constitutionality of ag-gag laws
without discussing the effects on unauthorized animal and
agriculture workers. 28 9 While avoiding the debate may be justified as
a wise exercise of judicial reservation, questions remain.
Little jurisprudence or literature exists on the subject of First
Amendment speech rights for unauthorized persons.
Professor
Cristina M. Rodriguez identifies the historic nexus between
immigrant rights and the U.S. civil rights movements. 290 Rodriguez
theorizes how current legal paradigms correlate unauthorized status
with subordination and marginalization. 29 1 As a result, unauthorized

283. MILK Editors, Chobani Yogurt Opposes Idaho Ag Gag Law, AG WEB
(Feb. 28, 2014, 3:31 AM), https://www.agweb.com/article/chobani-yogurt-opposes
_idaho-ag.gag-law-naa dairy-today-editors/.
284. See id.
285. Id.
286. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 297 F. Supp. 3d 901, 929 (D.
Iowa 2018); see also IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2012).
287. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, No. 4:17-cv-00362-JEG-HCA, 2019
WL 140069 (S.D. Iowa 2019).
288. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Stein, No. 17-1669,
2018 WL 2714684, at *7 (4th Cir. June 5, 2018); see also Court Restores Lawsuit
Against North Carolina 'Ag-Gag" Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 5, 2018),
https://www.apnews.com/587c8986377840319ded7dc455869cdd.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 231-72.
290. Cristina M. Rodriguez, Immigration and the Civil Rights Agenda, 6
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 125, 127-28 (2010).
291. Id. at 130.
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292
persons "lack the capacity to be effective social actors."
Unauthorized status also erases persons "from the political
conversation and makes it difficult for them to advocate their interest
to others." 293 Rodriguez hypothesizes that "society feels justified in
ignoring" unauthorized persons, who "are subject to almost
unrestrained state power." 294 "This power also facilitates exploitation
295
According to Rodriguez,
by private actors," including employers.
the legal marginalization of unauthorized persons leads to a social
marginalization that is exacerbated by socioeconomic status and

race.296

The interconnectivity of the global commercial food production
industry increases the need for the First Amendment to play an
important role in ensuring the flow of information, especially from
298
unauthorized workers. 297 Plyer v. Doe suggests that due to status,
unauthorized workers are ineligible for the type of heightened
299
Unauthorized status
scrutiny that suspect classes receive.
presumptively has no bearing on whether an infringement of the First
Amendment receives heightened status. The Ninth and Tenth
Circuits recognized how agriculture security legislation fell suspect
under the First Amendment because of the potential to suppress
300
If an
certain ideas or prohibit discussion of an entire topic.
about
employer wanted to suppress an unauthorized worker's speech
commercial food operations and production, an ag-gag law can help
the employer do so.
Agriculture security legislation exacerbates the fear of
deportation, which in turn could cause an unauthorized worker to
exercise caution when exercising First Amendment rights. For those
who have no reason to fear their legal status, line drawing begins
when publicity ceases to concern information to which the public is
entitled. 301 Liability lies where publicity becomes a "morbid" and
"sensational prying" simply for its own sake (or into matters of which
3 0 2 CurtisPublishingCompany v. Butts30 3
there is no public concern).
establishes an enduring First Amendment norm: that "dissemination
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Charlsie Dewey, Ag-Gag Laws: ProtectingIndustrialFarms, but from

What?, GRAND RAPIDS BUS. J. (June 21, 2013), http://www.grbj.com/articles
/77165-ag-gag-laws-protecting-industrial-farms-but-from-what.
298. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).

299. See id. at 223.
300. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1205 (9th Cir. 2018);

W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 869 F.3d 1189, 1195-96 (10th Cir. 2017).
301. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. g & h (AM. LAW INST.
1977).
302. Id.
303. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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of opinion on matters of public interest . . . [is] an 'unalienable
right."'3 04 However, there is "no special immunity" that grants
authority "to invade the rights and liberties of others." 305 Acceptable
limits on the right to disseminate information "must neither affect
'the impartial distribution of news' and ideas ... nor deprive our free
society of the stimulating benefit of varied ideas." 306
A core tenant of the First Amendment is that speakers should not
"fear physical or economic retribution solely because of what they
choose to think and publish."307 But for unauthorized workers in
some states, revealing truthful information about animal and
agriculture
production
could
require
disclosure
that
misrepresentations were used to obtain employment.3 08 Most ag-gag
litigation and scholarship has focused on normative theories for First
Amendment protection for undercover investigations. The Jungle
was published in 1906 after seven weeks of undercover work at
Chicago meatpacking plants. 309 Sinclair's expos6 was the catalyst for
a federal investigation that prompted the Meat Inspection Act and
the Pure Food and Drug Act. 310 In the years before and after The
Jungle, commercial animal and agribusinesses were not the only
targets of undercover investigations.
Nelly Bly famously went
undercover to write about mental hospitals and institutions in the
1890s. 311 Undercover filming and photographs in the latter half of
the 1900s documented "the operations of bookie parlors in St.
Louis,"3 12 the brutal response to peaceful resistance in the Jim Crow
South, and the Vietnam War. 313 William Sherman of the New York
Daily News received a Pulitzer Prize in the 1970s after posing as a
patient to report on Medicaid fraud 3 14 More recently, police shootings

304.

Id. at 149.

305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 150.
Id. at 151.
Id.
See supra notes 36, 158-65 and accompanying text (explaining the risks

associated with immigrants using false documents to gain employment).
309. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
310. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1201-02 (D.
Idaho 2016).
311. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, I Spy: The Newsgatherer Under Cover, 33
U. RICH. L. REV. 1185, 1190 (2000) (citing LouIs FILLER, APPOINTMENT AT
ARMAGEDDON: MUCKRAKING AND PROGRESSIVISM IN THE AMERICAN TRADITION 234
(1976)).

312.

Brief for Amici Curiae Association of American Publishers, supra note

226, at 24 (citing Zimmerman, supra note 311, at 1190) (citing JAMES H. DYGERT,
THE INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALIST: FOLK HEROES OF A NEW ERA 166-67 (1976)).

313. Brief for Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression and Scholars of
First Amendment and Information Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2016)
(No. 15-35960).
314. See Zimmerman, supra note 311, at 1190 (citing DYGERT, supra note 312,
at 66-67).
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debate on racial
captured on cell phone videos have renewed public
3 15
profiling and the use of force by law enforcement.
Like the speech of undercover investigators, the speech of
unauthorized workers can counter the false commercial speech of
Since Whalen v. Roe 316 rejected an
animal and agribusinesses.
317
the
absolute individual right to control information about oneself,
new millennium has seen continued exercise of the First Amendment
as authority to uncover harmful information about the food industry.
A 2007 undercover investigation in California showed "workers
forcing sick cows, many unable to walk," into kill boxes "by repeatedly
shocking them with electric prods, jabbing them in the eye, prodding
318
them with a forklift, and spraying water up their noses."

A 2009

investigation "in Iowa revealed hundreds of thousands of unwanted
day-old male chicks being funneled by conveyor belt into a macerator
to be ground up live." 3 19 Another Iowa investigation documented
"hens with gaping, untreated wounds laying eggs in cramped

315. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, We're Not Seeing More Police Shootings, Just
More News Coverage, CNN (Apr. 21, 2015, 7:26 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04
/20/us/police-brutality-video-social-media-attitudes/.
316. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
317. Id. Whalen questioned whether New York may record, in a centralized
computer file, the names and addresses of all persons who have obtained,
pursuant to a prescription, certain drugs for which there is both a lawful and
unlawful market. Id. at 591. In response to concerns that certain drugs were
being diverted into unlawful channels, New York created a special commission to
evaluate the state's drug control laws. Id. The commission found existing law
deficient and that there was no effective way to prevent the use of stolen or
revised prescriptions, to prevent unscrupulous pharmacists from repeatedly
refilling or overprescribing prescriptions, or to prevent users from obtaining
prescriptions from more than one doctor. Id. As a result, New York's drug statute
classified potentially harmful drugs in five schedules and required prescriptions
in certain categories be prepared by the physician in triplicate on an official form
that identified the prescribing physician, the dispensing pharmacy, the drug and
dosage, and the name, address, and age of the patient. Id. at 592-93. One of the
forms was forwarded to the New York State Department of Health, which had
certain security provisions. Id. at 593. Records were kept for a period of five
years after which they were destroyed and only seventeen employees and
twenty-four investigators had access to the records. Id. at 593-94. The records
were stored in a database located in a receiving room surrounded by locked wire
fence and protected by an alarm system. Id. at 594. The Court found two types
of privacy interests were at stake, preventing disclosure of personal matters and
independence to make important personal decisions, but that no infringement of
a fundamental right occurred. Id. at 599-600. New York's legislation was a
byproduct of rational legislative decision and did not pose a constitutionally
sufficient threat to a privacy interest. Id. at 597. New York has regulated in an
industry within which an invasion of privacy is accepted, and New York has
provided adequate safeguards to protect privacy. Id. at 600-02.
318. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1197 (D. Utah
2017).
319. Id.; see also Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 297 F. Supp. 3d 901,
908 (S.D. Iowa 2018) (discussing a 2008 investigation at an Iowa pig farm).
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conditions among decaying corpses. 320 An undercover investigation
in Vermont revealed "similarly gruesome footage of days-old calves
being

kicked,

dragged,

and

skinned

alive." 32 1

Undercover

investigators in Texas "filmed workers beating cows on the head with

hammers and pickaxes and leaving them to die." 322

Agriculture
security
legislation undervalues
the
First
Amendment right of unauthorized workers to speak about
commercial food production.
Industrial-scale animal factories
dominate U.S. livestock production, 323 but small farms grow a lot of
food too. 32 4 Yet, Open Secrets reported that in 2017 over one
thousand lobbyists earned or billed over $130 million in lobbying
expenses or expenditures on behalf of 440 U.S. animal and
agribusinesses. 25 Ag-gag laws show how businesses can lobby to
potentially control much of the nonproprietary information the public
receives about an industry. 326 Professors Brooke Kroeger and Ted
Conover discuss how ag-gag laws criminalize the tools by which
individuals seek to discover information, 327 specifically deceptive
techniques that are "critical to American journalism." 328
As
discussed, "the most celebrated journalists in recent history have
320. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1197.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Brief for Food & Water Watch & Center for Biological Diversity, supra
note 133, at 13-16; see also Anastasia Telesetsky, Community-Based Urban
Agriculture as Affirmative Environmental Justice, 91 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 259,
262 (2014) (arguing that "[h]ealthy food matters as an [issue of] environmental
justice"); cf. Jacobs, supra note 133, at 222-23 (describing the obstacles of urban
agriculture that are unlike industrial-scale rural agriculture); Jessica Owley &
Tonya Lewis, From Vacant Lots to Full Pantries: Urban Agriculture Programs
and the American City, 91 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 233, 241-42 (2014) (explaining
that urban agriculture is a way to improve abandoned urban lots rather than a
replacement to industrial-scale agriculture).
324. The number of small farms counted in the 2012 Census of Agriculture
amounted to 97% of the 2.1 million farms in the U.S. NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OFAGRIC., 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE: SMALL FARMS 1 (Sept.
2016),
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2016/
SmallFamilyFarms.pdf. Approximately 88% "of all farms were small family
farms with less than $350,000 in gross cash farm income." Id. Almost 9% of
farms are mid-size and large family owned and 3% were not family owned. Id.
"Small family farms operated 48[%] of all farmland, owned 47[%] of the value of
farm real estate (land and buildings), accounted for 20[%] of agriculture sales,
and earned 5[%] of the country's net farm income." Id.
325. Agribusiness Sector Profile, 2017, OPEN SECRETS (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indus.php?id=A&year=2017.
326. What Is Ag-Gag Legislation?, AM. Soc'Y FOR PREVENTION CRUELTY TO
ANIMALS,
https://www.aspca.org/animal-protection/public-policy/what-ag-gaglegislation (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).
327. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Brooke Kroeger and Ted Conover in
Support of Affirmance at 6-12, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184
(9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-35960) (citing BROOKE KROEGER, UNDERCOVER REPORTING:
THE TRUTH ABOUT DECEPTION 3 (2012)).

328. Id. at 10.
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often relied on the use of deception, misrepresentation, and other
practices associated with undercover investigation to uncover329or
observe facts and practices otherwise obscured from public view."
Agriculture security legislation heightens the threat of coercion
due to unauthorized status. Largely due to the First Amendment's
broad protection, modern U.S. consumers expect transparency at
33 0
almost every level of commercial food production -ag-gag laws
prevent transparency. This expectation "extends beyond food safety
issues. Consumers want to know everything they can about food
33 1
production," especially animal and agriculture farming practices.
Within the marketplace of food, the consumer's "interest in the free
332
includes expos6s about
flow of commercial information"
333
Leading food law scholars
agricultural or animal malpractice.
point to how consumers look to the marketplace to form eating
habits. 33 4 Eating habits dictate what farmers grow and impact
33 5
Modern consumers pay
conservation practices and food networks.
336
unnatural ingredients.
exclude
more for organic food products that
"Preferences for fair trade and the movement against genetically
modified ("GMO") ingredients also motivate [growing and] buying
practices."337
Because of agriculture security legislation, many animal and
agribusiness workers have another reason to fear discovery of
unauthorized status. But consumers will want to know more about
all aspects of food production, especially when government agencies
8
fail to sufficiently monitor the industry. 33 Estimates largely describe
339
an "inadequate system for enforcing farm worker safety."
"According to one estimate, it would take [the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration] 115 years to inspect each workplace in

329. Id. at 5.
330. Brief of Amici Curiae Food Law and Policy Scholars, supra note 185, at
12 (quoting Negowetti, supranote 188, at 1373).
331. Id. at 5; see also Wendel, supra note 188, at 283-85 (discussing the
overlap between urban farming and the environmental movement and describing
urban farming as "the quintessential 'locally grown' food").
332. Brief of Amici Curiae Food Law and Policy Scholars, supra note 185, at
13-14 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976)).
333. Id. at 15-16.
334. See id. at 11-12.
335. See id. at 11 (quoting Andrew Martin, Is a Food Revolution Now in
Season?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2009, at BU1).
336. See id. at 9.
337. Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Ag-Gag Free Detroit, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
669, 683 (2016) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Food Law and Policy Scholars,
supra note 185, at 9).
338. See Brief of Amici Curiae Food Law and Policy Scholars, supra note 185,
at 15.
339. See Brief of Amici Curiae United Farm Workers of America, supra note
4, at 15.
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the country just once." 340

In this respect, ag-gag laws potentially

prevent consumers from hearing from unauthorized workers about
the conditions at animal and agriculture production facilities. 341
Ag-gag laws demonstrate how some businesses can operate in the
political process even in the wake of the disclosure of damaging
information. 342 "Agriculture [consistently] ranks among the most
dangerous industries in the United States."343 The injury and fatality

rate for agricultural workers are several times higher than for all
other workers. 344 Agriculture and farm workers regularly lack
"proper training or protective equipment." 345 According to the United
Farmworkers of America, "far too often industry employers set
workplace policies that unduly add to and exacerbate" the inherent of
3 6
risks of the industry. 4
If the threat of arrest or deportation effectively silences the voices
of unauthorized workers abo c., unsafe work conditions or food
production practices, agriculture security legislation provides little to
mitigate those harms. Ag-gag laws distort the marketplace of ideas
about the food production industry. 347 In this marketplace, like all
marketplaces, "the right to hear-[and] the right to receive
information-is no less protected by the First Amendment than the

340. Id.
341. See Brief for Food & Water Watch & Center for Biological Diversity,
supra note 133, at 13-16 (discussing abuses at facilities); see also Jaime Bouvier,
Why UrbanAgriculture Can Be Controversial:Exploring the CulturalAssociation
of UrbanAgriculture with Backwardness, Race, Gender, and Poverty, 91 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 205, 211 (2014) (discussing how "in 1920, approximately [30%] of
the [U.S.] population lived on a farm" as opposed to 2012 when "only 1.1% of the
population live[d] on a farm"); Owley & Lewis, supra note 323, at 241-42;
Telesetsky, supra note 323, at 261-62. See generally Jacobs, supra note 133, at
222-23; Lynn Sholander, Green Thumbs in the City: Incentivizing Urban
Agriculture on UnoccupiedDetroit Public School DistrictLand, 91 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 173 (2014).

342. See generally Roy Peled, Occupy Information: The Case for Freedom of
Corporate Information, 9 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 261, 270 (2013) (discussing how
corporations are able to involve themselves in significant political decisions
without being subject to freedom of information law which require disclosure of
government records).
343. Brief of Amici Curiae United Farm Workers of America, supra note 4, at
12.

344. Id. (citing Safety and Health Topics: Agricultural Operations, OSHA,
https://www.osha.gov/dsg/topics/agriculturaloperations/).
345. See Brief of Amici Curiae United Farm Workers of America, supra note
4, at 13; see also FARMWORKER JUSTICE, EXPOSED AND IGNORED: How PESTICIDES
ARE
ENDANGERING
OUR
NATION'S
FARMWORKERS
6
(2013),

https://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/default/files/aExposed%/20and /%2OIgno
red%20by%20Farmworker%20Justice%20singles%20compressed.pdf.
346. See Brief of Amici Curiae United Farm Workers of America, supra note
4, at 13.
347. See Dewey, supra note 297.
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right to speak."348 Ag-gag laws envision control over nonproprietary
information as a one-way proposition where the owner or operator of
an agribusiness holds an exclusive "right."349 Privacy or security in
the context of commercial food production has other dimensions.
Consumers have the right to know and chose what to consume as a
matter of health, religious belief, and conscience. The public has the
right to government accountability because tax dollars fund
regulation of the food industry. Consumers and competitors have
enforceable rights against unfair competition.
The lack of clarity about the scope of the "right" that agriculture
security legislation protects provides another reason to consider the
First Amendment implications of ag-gag laws for unauthorized
workers. These uncertainties also directly implicate whether any
ag-gag state can claim a sufficient enough purpose under the First
Reed v. Town of Gilbert350 requires more than a
Amendment.
legitimate interest from both content-based and content-neutral
restrictions. Content-based laws must meet strict scrutiny, which
requires a compelling interest. 351 Reed describes content-neutral
laws as receiving a "lesser scrutiny." 35 2 This "lesser scrutiny" does
not imply rational basis review and its requirement of a legitimate
interest. 35 3 Content-neutral laws require an important or substantial
government interest. 3 54 Thus, content-based and content-neutral
regulations receive heightened scrutiny.
Agriculture security legislation gives agribusinesses a powerful
threat against unauthorized workers who wish to provide
nonproprietary information about commercial food production. Until
ag-gag laws, agribusinesses lacked security or privacy rights besides
laws that protected proprietary information. 35 5 Outside the context

348. See Brief of Amici Curiae Food Law and Policy Scholars, supra note 185,
at 13 (quoting Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 643 (9th Cir. 2002)).
349. See Lisa Sorg, FederalJudge Tosses Ag-Gag Law as Unconstitutional,
Could InvalidateNorth Carolina'sStatute, NC POL'Y WATCH: PROGRESSIVE PULSE
(July 26, 2017), http://pulse.ncpolicywatch.org/2017/07/26/federal-judge-tosses(contradicting
ag-gag-law-unconstitutional-invalidate-north-carolinas-statute!
the notion that ag-gag laws are intended to protect proprietary information).
350. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
351. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42, 662
(1994).
352. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2232.
353. Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc., 512 U.S. at 662.
354. Id.
355.

See generally Kayla Robinson, Note, Corporate Rights and Individual

Interests: The Corporate Right to Privacy as a Bulwark Against Warrantless
Government Surveillance, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2283, 2288 (2015) (discussing
three premises for the creation of privacy rights for corporations). Robinson
provides three premises for the type of corporate privacy right that ag-gag laws
create. First, "corporations are legal persons and are entitled to bear legal rights,
including constitutional rights." Id. Second, "corporations have distinct privacy
interests and property interests that are protected by a right to privacy." Id.
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of proprietary information, the Court recognizes corporate privacy in
the criminal context but not the civil context. 356 Even if the
recognition of Fourth Amendment privacy rights triggered an
implication of First Amendment privacy rights, corporate privacy still
remains a matter of state law. 357 State law must acclimatize to the
358
First Amendment.
It is unknown how the type of security or privacy that ag-gag laws
protect outweighs the need to prevent coercion of unauthorized
persons in the commercial food production workforce. Businesses in
general have "a reduced objective expectation of privacy in the
workplace" unless that information is of a "highly intimate nature."3 59
The method of gathering and disseminating information about food
practices rarely causes public outrage. If the dissemination of
information is distasteful, it is primarily because of the business
practices that are exposed.
Dissemination does not "seriously
aggrieve" the public when publicity is a matter of legitimate public
concern. 36 0
Ag-gag laws allow control over who gathers and
disseminates nonproprietary information about animal and
agriculture practices even where such information is in the public's
interest. This alters the common understanding that no corporation,
partnership, or unincorporated association has a right to privacy
except for "a limited right to the exclusive use of its own name or
36
identity." 1
Agriculture security legislation removes the impediments to
traditional common and constitutional law of trespass and
defamation, 362 which causes special concerns about the application of
ag-gag laws against unauthorized workers. The legislative histories
of ag-gag laws do not explain why existing criminal and civil remedies
inadequately protect animal and agriculture facilities.
Perhaps
because defamation does not protect against disclosure of truthful
information and trespass does not always bar access for undercover
investigations. Ag-gag laws borrow components of defamation law,
which protects reputation, and components of trespass law, which
Finally, "corporate rights relate to the rights of individuals involved in those
corporations." Id.
356. See generally Elizabeth Pollman, A CorporateRight to Privacy, 99 MINN.
L. REV. 27, 48 (2014) (discussing how a corporation is entitled to Fourth
Amendment privacy rights against unreasonable search and seizure).
357. See supra notes 197-208 and accompanying text (discussing various
state ag-gag laws).
358. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the
First Amendment's protection of free speech).
359. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d
1182, 1188 (D. Ariz. 1998), affld, 306 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
360. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977).

361. Id. § 5621 cmt. c.
362. Brief for Amici Curiae Association of American Publishers, supra note
226, at 23-24.
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limits access, to create a statutory right against nongovernment
363
Ag-gag laws also
intrusions into nonproprietary information.
exploit the interrelatedness between privacy and trespass and
privacy and reputational harms to prevent disclosure about truthful
and nonproprietary information that a business prefers to keep
private.364
Agriculture security legislation intersects with the emerging
corporate privacy debate, further implicating the First Amendment
rights of unauthorized workers. Professor Anita Allen is a leading
365
scholar on rethinking the arguments against corporate privacy.
Allen describes tortious invasion of privacy as a "comparatively recent
phenomenon in Anglo-American law" 366 and distinguishes privacy
from publicity by describing the latter as a "heritable commercial"
36 7
Allen
right that can be freely traded in the marketplace.
demonstrates how courts rely on metaphysical and teleological
grounds for denying corporate privacy. 36 8 Because corporations are
creations of law, they metaphysically lack the traits necessary to
Corporations are also teleologically
ascribe privacy rights. 36 9
The metaphysical ground
inconsistent with privacy rights.3 7 0
therefore "reflects a theoretical conception of the fundamental
essence of corporate existence," 371 and the teleological ground
"depends upon a view about the design or purpose of ascribing
372
particular rights."
How corporate privacy and the speech rights of unauthorized
workers weigh against each other is unclear. Professor Elizabeth
Pollman describes corporate privacy as an "open question" and
hypothesizes that corporations for the most part do not enjoy a
constitutional right to privacy. 373 Pollman interprets the Court's
privacy jurisprudence for groups or organizations as including: (1) the
right to make certain decisions without government interference; and
(2) the right to avoid disclosure of personal or proprietary
information. 374 Pollman examines how the First Amendment often
identifies the public and its consumers as one of the beneficiaries of

363. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Brooke Kroeger and Ted Conover,
supra note 327, at 19.
364. Id. at 15.
365. Anita Allen, Rethinking the Rule Against CorporatePrivacy Rights: Some
Conceptual Quandariesfor the Common Law, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 607, 618,
621 (1987).
366. Id. at 612.
367. Id. at 611.
368. Id. at 611-17; see also id. at 611-12 nn. 29-30.
369. Id. at 613.
370. Id. at 615.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Pollman, supra note 360, at 33, 62.
374. Id. at 55-62.
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commercial speech regulations. 375 This jurisprudence proscribes
more, not less speech, to counter falsity.3 7 6 Pollman distinguishes
between public, private, and nonprofit private corporations, but
points out how none enjoy a constitutionally protectable right to
privacy. 377 Pollman concludes that each could have some privacy
interests worth protecting but does not offer how governments should
do so.

3 78

No court has addressed whether corporate privacy outweighs the
First Amendment rights of unauthorized workers to speak about
unsafe food practices or any other issue related to work conditions.
Professors Eric Orts and Amy Sepinwall echo Pollman's uncertainty
about the recognition of corporate privacy "rights."379 Orts and
Sepinwall identify six aspects of privacy: (1) a right to be let alone; (2)
a right to limited access to self; (3) a right to secrecy or concealment
of certain matters; (4) control over personal information or
information about oneself; (5) personhood; and (6) intimacy.38 0 They
acknowledge the link between corporate privacy rights and the
individuals involved in those corporations. 38 ' Orts and Sepinwall
distinguish between rights that originate with the corporation itself
and rights that derive from the individuals who own, govern, and
maintain the corporation. 38 2 Orts and Sepinwall categorize the
former as primary rights that only the corporation can waive. 38 3 The
latter are secondary rights, for which individual owners exercise
control. 38 4 Orts and Sepinwall examine the scope of informational
and decisional corporate privacy 38 5 and find the likelihood of strong
protection for both unclear as a constitutional matter. 38 6
Whether corporate privacy outweighs the public right to access
information about food production seems to have been negatively
answered by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, but how these decisions
relate to unauthorized workers is unknown. Professor Mary Fan
offers a look at the "right" to corporate privacy that differs from
Pollman and Orts and Sepinwall. Fan views corporate privacy as
primarily grounded in statutory authority. 387
Businesses can

375. Id. at 72-77.
376. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727-28 (2012) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)).
377. Pollman, supra note 360, at 64, 77-80, 84.
378. Id. at 84-88.
379. Eric Orts & Amy Sepinwall, Privacy and OrganizationalPersons, 99
MINN. L. REV. 2275, 2278 (2015).

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id. at 2281; see also Pollman, supra note 360, at 60.
Orts & Sepinwall, supranote 379, at 2287-92.
Id.
Id. at 2293-96.
Id.
Id. at 2305-13.
Id. at 2316-22.
See Fan, supra note 194, at 164, 171-77.
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contractually keep their secrets intact.3 88 State and federal court
38 9
Trade
rules and statutes commonly authorize protective orders.
secret laws, although rife with complications, indefinitely shield
390
Patent laws shield
nonpublic information from public disclosure.
391
Outside of the
information for a limited amount of time.
above-mentioned categories, corporations generally have no rightstatutory or otherwise-to control nonproprietary information simply
because it is distasteful or would have a negative effect on the
business or its profits.
Circumstances may govern whether the "law treats corporations
392
and whether such
as 'persons' deserving of constitutional rights"
rights would apply against unauthorized workers in the context of
agriculture security legislation. The Court recently found in Federal
393
that 'personal
Communications Commission v. AT&T, Inc.
privacy'.., suggests a type of privacy evocative of human concerns394
While AT&T, Inc.
not [of that] usually associated with an entity."
interpreted a definition of privacy under the Freedom of Information
Act, it inade clear that privacy rights, by their very nature, were
intrinsically dependent on the human or corporate nature of the
holder. 395 Ultimately, the Court found the case did not involve "the
scope of a corporation's 'privacy' interests as a matter of constitutional
3 96
or common law."
The role of the corporate privacy debate as it relates to
agriculture security legislation and unauthorized workers may seem
to lack importance on the surface. Yet, an examination of modern
U.S. tort and constitutional law reveals little basis for abandoning the
protection the First Amendment has traditionally provided to those
who gather and disseminate information about commercial activities.
388.

Id. at 171, 174-75.

389. Id. at 172-77.
390. Id. at 173.
391. Id.
392. Lucy L. Holifield, Comment, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter:

IndustrialFood ProductionSimply is Not a PrivateMatter, 12 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y
16, 47 (2016); see also Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment:
Representative Democracy and the People's Elusive "Right to Know," 72 MD. L.
REV. 1, 29-30 (2012).

393. FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011).
394. Id. at 398. AT&T was part of an FCC program that provided

telecommunications and information services to schools and libraries. Id. at 400.
In 2004, AT&T voluntarily reported overcharges under the program and paid
restitution. Id. One of AT&T's competitors filed a FOIA request and a dispute
emerged regarding whether AT&T had a privacy interest in any of the requested
documents relinquished during the FCC investigation. Id. at 400-01. The Court
found Congress did not intend to grant privacy rights to corporations and pointed
to comment c to section 6521 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and section 97
of Law of Torts in its discussion of the lack of recognition for corporate privacy
rights. Id. at 405-09.
395. See id. at 402-07.
396. Id. at 407.
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No animal or agribusiness that operates in the commercial
marketplace can hardly expect to "enjoy a life of reserve outside the
public gaze." 39 7 Moreover, commercial speech jurisprudence does not

protect false or misleading communications. 398 Ag-gag laws upset
First Amendment norms by threatening the search for true
commercial speech. In the context of food production, ag-gag laws
extend corporate privacy further than the individual right and allow
for a previously unheard of degree of control over nonproprietary
commercial information.
V. CONCLUSION

From a First Amendment perspective, unauthorized workers
play a unique role in diversifying the marketplace of information
about the U.S. animal and agriculture industry.3 99 Ag-gag laws
create another method to threaten unauthorized workers with
deportation, which exacerbates the coercive environment that
disincentives an unauthorized worker's exercise of First Amendment
speech rights. This Article does not suggest that disclosure of
information about unsafe food practices or work conditions should
create a bar to immigration enforcement. Rather, this Article points
out the discrete threat that ag-gag laws pose to unauthorized
workers.
Recognition of the First Amendment implications for
unauthorized workers should prove helpful to a more holistic
understanding of the broad scope of many ag-gag laws.

397. Anita L. Allen, Natural Law, Slavery, and the Right to Privacy Tort, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 1187, 1210 (2012).
398. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 557
(1980). The Public Service Commission of New York ordered electric utilities in
the state to cease all advertising based on the finding that the state's utility
systems did not have sufficient fuel stocks to meet consumer demands for the
winter of 1973-74. Id. at 558-59. The Commission continued the ban three years
past the shortage. Id. at 559. The Court reversed decades of precedent and held
that the First Amendment protects commercial speech from unwarranted
government regulation based on the informational function of advertising. Id. at
561-63. Commercial speech that is more likely to deceive than inform the public
may be banned. Id. at 563. The Court announced the government has the burden
of proof on the following four-part test for commercial speech: (1) Does speech
advertise illegal or unlawful activities or is it false or deceptive?; (2) Is the law
justified by a substantial interest?; '(3) Does the law directly advance the
interest?; (4) Is the law no more extensive than necessary (i.e. narrow tailoring)
to achieve the interest? Id. at 566.
399. Brief of Amici Curiae Food Law and Policy Scholars, supra note 185, at
11-12.

